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Executive Summary 
This working paper develops a framework to analyze the circumstances under which non-state 
armed groups recognize a conflict as negotiable. The concept of negotiability disaggregates ripeness 
theory to focus on the perspective of one party. For negotiability to be given, a critical mass within 
the group must perceive a negotiated solution as desirable, legitimate and achievable. Rather than a 
single and linear decision, the transformation towards negotiability is an evolving and potentially 
reversible process involving the participation of different actors within a group.  
The paper argues that intra-group processes mediate the perception of negotiability and that third-
party engagement may contribute to fostering the group’s view that ‘a time to talk’ has come. Based 
on a review of literature and a series of interviews with experienced mediation practitioners, the 
paper seeks to provide some insights on how to engage with armed groups. 
The analytical framework in this paper presents two factors that must be present for an armed group 
to move towards negotiability: First, the group needs to perceive an irredeemable and painful status 
quo, the ‘hurting stalemate’, pushing them away from the combative strategy and, therefore, 
making negotiations desirable. Push factors are shaped by the interaction of the military, political 
and economic dimensions of the conflict. Second, the armed group must sense the prospect of a 
satisfactory agreement, the ‘way out’, pulling them towards negotiations. Without the perception of 
negotiations as a legitimate and achievable alternative, an armed group might suffer from a painful 
deadlock, but it has no viable alternative to the continuation of violence. Three interconnected 
elements define the pull factors: a peace process has to be compatible with the group’s worldview 
and interests; the group requires some basic confidence in the government as a negotiating partner; 
and the group must have some trust in the negotiation process. 
For an armed group to turn towards negotiability, a critical mass within the group must perceive the 
push and pull factors appropriately. Although internal structures and processes are unique to each 
group, certain general dynamics to make sense of decision-making are distinguished.  
Recognizing that third parties may foster negotiability, the working paper suggests an approach to 
prepare an effective engagement strategy. Without discarding the merits of a more forceful 
approach, the paper concentrates on persuasive means of engagement. Acting on the armed group’s 
perceptions, third parties can convince the rebels of the futility of continued armed struggle and the 
attractiveness of a negotiated exit. This type of approach works mostly through backchannel 
engagement and through the promotion of a process of moderation, re-assessment, as well as 
confidence and capacity building. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Dieses Working Paper entwickelt ein Modell zur Analyse der Umstände, unter welchen 
nichtstaatliche bewaffnete Gruppen einen Konflikt als verhandelbar ansehen. Das Konzept der 
sogenannten „Negotiability“ basiert auf der „Ripeness“-Theorie und konzentriert sich dabei auf die 
Perspektive einer Konfliktpartei. Damit Negotiability gegeben ist, muss eine kritische Masse 
innerhalb einer Gruppe die verhandelte Konfliktlösung als wünschenswert, legitim und erreichbar 
erachten. Der Übergang zur Verhandlungsbereitschaft ist kein linearer Entscheidungsprozess, 
sondern eine umkehrbare Entwicklung, welche die Teilnahme verschiedener Akteure innerhalb der 
Gruppe beinhaltet.  
Dieses Paper argumentiert, dass Prozesse innerhalb der Gruppe die Wahrnehmung der 
Verhandlungsbereitschaft definieren und dass der Einbezug Dritter die Einsicht, wonach der 
Zeitpunkt für Verhandlungen gekommen ist, fördern kann. Basierend auf einer Literaturstudie und 
einer Reihe von Interviews mit erfahrenen Mediatoren, versucht dieses Working Paper Einblicke in 
den Umgang mit bewaffneten Gruppen zu geben.  
Das in diesem Paper vorgestellte analytische Modell bezieht sich auf zwei Faktoren, welche für das 
Entstehen der Verhandlungsbereitschaft in einer bewaffneten Gruppe gegeben sein müssen: Erstens, 
muss die Gruppe einen unabänderlichen und schmerzhaften Status quo wahrnehmen, die 
„schädigende Pattsituation“, die sie von der kämpferischen Strategie abbringt und dadurch 
Verhandlungen wünschenswert macht. Diese Push-Faktoren werden von der Interaktion der 
militärischen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Dimensionen des Konflikts geformt. Zweitens, muss 
die bewaffnete Gruppe die Aussicht auf eine zufriedenstellende Vereinbarung erkennen, den 
„Ausweg“, der sie an den Verhandlungstisch bringt. Wenn Verhandlungen nicht als legitime und 
mögliche Alternative wahrgenommen werden, hat eine bewaffnete Gruppe keine valable Alternative 
zur Fortsetzung der Gewalt, auch wenn die militärische Vorgehensweise nicht erfolgsversprechend 
ist. Drei miteinander verbundene Elemente definieren die Pull-Faktoren: ein Friedensprozess muss 
mit der Weltanschauung und den Interessen der Gruppe kompatibel sein; die Gruppe benötigt ein 
Grundvertrauen in die Regierung als Verhandlungspartnerin; und die Gruppe muss dem 
Verhandlungsprozess ausreichend Vertrauen entgegen bringen.  
Damit sich eine bewaffnete Gruppe an den Verhandlungstisch setzt, muss eine kritische Masse 
innerhalb der Gruppe die Push und Pull-Faktoren entsprechend beurteilen. Um 
Entscheidungsprozesse zu erklären, werden bestimmte allgemeine Dynamiken unterschieden, 
obwohl interne Strukturen und Prozesse für jede Gruppe einzigartig sind.  
Mit der Erkenntnis, dass Dritte die Verhandlungsbereitschaft fördern können, schlägt das Working 
Paper einen Ansatz für die Vorbereitung einer effektiven Vorgehensweise vor. Ohne die Vorzüge 
eines zwingenden Ansatzes ausser Acht zu lassen, konzentriert sich das Paper auf Mittel der 
Überzeugung. Durch das Einwirken auf die Wahrnehmung der bewaffneten Gruppe, können 
Drittparteien die Rebellen von der Zwecklosigkeit der Fortführung ihres bewaffneten Kampfes 
überzeugen und die Attraktivität eines Ausstiegs über Verhandlungen darlegen. Diese Art des 
Ansatzes entfaltet seine Wirkung hauptsächlich über die Nutzung inoffizieller 
Kommunikationskanäle (backchannel engagement), dem Fördern eines Mässigungsprozesses, 
Neubewertungen (re-assessment) sowie Vertrauensbildung (confidence building) und dem Aufbau 
von Kapazitäten (capacity building). 
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Résumé 
Ce « working paper » propose un cadre analytique permettant de mieux comprendre les 
circonstances qui amènent les groupes armés non étatiques à décider qu’un conflit est négociable. 
Le concept de négociabilité désagrège la théorie du « conflit mûr » pour se concentrer sur le point de 
vue d’une partie au conflit. Pour que le choix de la négociabilité prévale, il doit y avoir une claire 
majorité dans le groupe qui estime qu’une solution négociée est désirable, légitime et réalisable. On 
observe que la transformation vers la négociabilité est un processus qui évolue plutôt qu’une simple 
décision linéaire. Elle peut aussi changer en fonction de la participation de différents acteurs dans le 
groupe. 
Ce « working paper » argumente que les processus internes aux groupes façonnent la perception de 
négociabilité et que l’engagement d’un parti tiers peut contribuer à renforcer l’idée que le temps est 
venu de négocier au sein du groupe. Basé sur une revue de la littérature et sur une série d’entretiens 
avec des médiateurs expérimentés, le papier cherche à donner quelques pistes sur la manière de 
travailler avec les groupes armés sur ces questions.  
Le cadre théorique de ce « working paper » révèle deux points clé pour qu’un groupe armé se dirige 
vers le choix de négocier. Tout d’abord, le groupe doit percevoir « une impasse douloureuse » qui 
l’éloigne de son choix stratégique de lutte armée et qui rend la solution négociée une option 
désirable. Les facteurs poussant les parties vers la négociation sont conditionnés par l’interaction 
entre les dimensions militaires, politiques et économiques du conflit. Deuxièmement, le groupe armé 
doit sentir la possibilité d’un accord satisfaisant, c’est-à-dire une « issue possible » qui l’encourage à 
la négociation. Si la solution négociée n’est ni perçue comme légitime ni comme une alternative 
réaliste, les groupes armés peuvent souffrir dans une situation d’impasse mais néanmoins ne pas 
avoir d’alternatives à la continuation de la lutte armée. Trois éléments interconnectés définissent les 
facteurs qui rendent la négociation attrayante: le processus de paix doit être compatible avec les 
vues et intérêts du groupe armé; les groupes armés doivent avoir un minimum de confiance dans le 
gouvernement comme partenaire de négociation ainsi que dans le processus de négociation lui-
même.  
Pour que le groupe armé choisisse la voie de la négociation, la majorité du groupe doit bien 
percevoir les facteurs les poussant vers la négociation ainsi que ceux qui rendent la négociation 
attrayante. Bien que les structures internes et les processus soient uniques à chaque groupe, on 
observe certaines dynamiques communes sur la façon dont se prennent les décisions. 
En soulignant que les partis tiers peuvent faciliter la voie de la négociation, ce « working paper » 
suggère une approche pour préparer l’engagement vers cette voie. Sans dénigrer les mérites d’une 
approche contraignante, ce « working paper » se concentre plutôt sur les moyens persuasifs face 
aux groupes armés. En travaillant sur la perception d’un groupe armé, un parti tiers peut le 
convaincre de la futilité de la continuation la lutte armée et de l’attrait d’une solution négociée. Ce 
type d’approche fonctionne surtout par un engagement discret et par la promotion d’un processus 
de modération et de réévaluation ainsi que par le renforcement de la confiance et des capacités. 
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Introduction 
From 1940 until the end of the Cold War, military victory was the dominant mode of ending civil 
war, but in the 1990s negotiated settlements became as frequent as military victories. Hence, 
despite their original intent to redress grievances through violence, armed groups regularly engage 
in negotiations (Toft, 2009). This working paper focuses on non-state armed groups and explores the 
conditions that must apply for these groups to renege on the armed struggle and engage in peace 
negotiations.  
The paper develops a framework to analyze the circumstances under which an armed group 
recognizes the conflict as negotiable. The objective of the framework is to explain when a rebel 
group is genuinely willing to consider negotiations, not when negotiations begin or when they reach 
a successful agreement. Therefore, negotiations to simply manage defeat or victory are not included. 
Developing the concept of negotiability, the paper disaggregates ripeness theory to focus on the 
perspective of one party. Negotiability for armed groups is present when a critical mass within the 
group considers a negotiated solution as desirable, legitimate and achievable. For this to happen, 
the rebels must perceive a push away from the combative strategy as well as a pull towards 
negotiations. Rather than a single and linear decision, the transformation towards negotiability is an 
evolving and potentially reversible process. The working paper argues that the subjective 
perceptions of the push and pull factors are mediated by intra-group processes and that third-party 
engagement may have an impact on fostering negotiability.  
Given the arguments and evidence presented, this paper maintains that the concept of negotiability 
has particular relevance for mediation practitioners. A better understanding of negotiability allows 
third parties to engage with armed groups in a more purposeful way to facilitate their shift from 
violence to cooperation. With the appropriate approach, third parties may contribute to fostering the 
group’s perception that ‘a time to talk’ has come. In this context, the paper also seeks to provide 
mediation practitioners with some insights for devising strategies to engage with armed groups. 
Developing a framework bears the risk of overgeneralizing highly complex social phenomena. Thus, 
it is important to note at the outset that this working paper presents an analytical framework that 
can structure reflection on the subject, but that is not a substitute for a thorough understanding of 
individual groups and conflicts.  
The paper draws on a review of relevant literature as well as on the insights from a series of 
interviews with experienced mediation practitioners. During the research for this paper, the author 
conducted semi-structured interviews with thirteen mediation practitioners from governments, the 
United Nations as well non-governmental and faith-based organizations. Most of these practitioners 
have extensive first-hand experience of engaging with armed groups and supporting negotiations in 
the context of intrastate conflicts. The interviews were conducted in person or over the phone. The 
insights gained from these interviews inspired the arguments as well as the structure of this paper. 
Direct quotes from the interviews are used to highlight important aspects of how armed groups 
operate and what third parties can do to foster negotiability. For confidentiality purposes the quotes 
are made anonymous and do not refer to particular mediation processes.  
The reader of this paper will notice that the framework includes elements of rational choice theory 
as well as constructivist arguments. Negotiability includes a cost-benefit analysis, wherein the group 
evaluates the option of perpetuating armed conflict against that of a potential agreement. However, 
this analysis is filtered by social perception and value judgment. The push and pull factors can be 
perceived in different ways, and the group members’ worldview will necessarily play a role as they 
consider the legitimacy of negotiations. For this reason, the paper examines both the impact of 
material factors of the conflict and the subjective perceptions of the armed groups in order to build 
the analytical framework. While such a theoretical synthesis might not satisfy adherents of 
methodological purity, this middle ground attempts to capture the reality of the complex dynamics 
involved in the decision to engage in negotiations.  
 Introduction 
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The working paper is structured as follows: Part I addresses a number of conceptual issues, such as 
the definition and the characteristics of armed groups, ripeness theory and the concept of 
negotiability. Part II builds the analytical framework for negotiability. Three cases are used to 
illustrate particular aspects of the framework: the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) prior to the 
Belfast Agreement in 1998; the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) with regard to 
the 1998-2002 negotiations; and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) up to the temporary 
breakdown of the peace process in 2008. Part III discusses the role of third parties and Part IV 
proposes different means of how these third parties can contribute to fostering negotiability.  
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1 Negotiability and Armed Groups 
Before analyzing in more detail the conditions that make armed groups open to negotiations, it is 
important to delineate the subject of analysis and define key concepts. Hence, this chapter first 
develops a definition for armed groups and explores the advantages of a composite actor approach. 
Building on a short overview of the theory of ripeness, the chapter then illustrates the concept of 
negotiability.  
1.1 Defining Armed Groups 
Assigning a particular label to a group entails the risk of oversimplifying. Gerald Seymour’s (2007) 
quote ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ draws attention to the potential 
ideological component inherent in the act of attaching names to armed groups. Any particular term 
has the ability to distort the group’s purpose, activities, local relevance and ideology (Bhatia, 2005). 
Attempting to avoid normative statements, this working paper uses the terms ‘armed group’, ‘rebel 
group’ and ‘insurgent’ interchangeably, defining them as non-state actors that use armed action to 
challenge the authority of the state. Hence, these groups can be described as existing outside 
effective government control and using armed violence as a means to a political end (Conciliation 
Resources, 2009). Considering only armed groups that explicitly defy the authority of the state, 
either through rebellion or resistance, the paper excludes criminal organizations as well as 
paramilitary groups in collusion with the state (Whitfield, 2010, p. 5). Although the delimitation 
between political and criminal intent may be blurred at times, it is nevertheless useful to consider 
the motives which go beyond the pursuit of material benefits. 
While such a broad definition reflects the diversity of armed groups, there is a risk of excessive 
generalization when analyzing these groups. To avoid simplified conclusions, each group must be 
understood within its own socio-political environment. Cronin (2009) argues that an armed group’s 
inherent logic can only be understood through an examination of its history and nature, including 
“the breadth of its constituency, the cause it pursues, and the degree to which members deem 
violence to be advancing that cause” (p. 42). Thus is order to understand and build on the rebels’ 
logic, it is important to consider their discourse as well as their actions. 
Incentives to negotiate are different for armed groups than for states. Rebel groups generally stand 
to gain from negotiations, be it legitimacy, time and access to official structures, or resources, while 
the government usually has to renounce some authority and may wish to avoid appearing weak 
when agreeing to negotiate (Svensson, 2007; Melin & Svensson, 2009). In addition, both sets of 
actors have different capacities and legitimacy. Armed groups might hold significant parts of the 
territory and execute government-like functions, but, in most cases, they do not have historically 
built bureaucracies and control over large infrastructure. 
1.2 Armed Groups as Composite Actors 
Many observers of armed conflict, and even scholars, often simplistically refer to rebel groups as 
coherent entities. While most armed groups, to whom the above definition applies, exhibit a degree 
of organizational structure, there are important internal dynamics that condition their decisions and 
actions. Although these groups may engage in rational strategic behavior, they rarely function as 
unitary actors (Cronin, 2009).  
As a result of the unstable conflict environment, rebels do not benefit from perfect information 
about their own capabilities and the intentions of their adversary. Together with differences in 
interests and views, the lack of clarity stimulates diverging interpretations within the group. Rebels 
are often torn and compete over the question of whether to talk or to fight. Furthermore, they are 
subject to collective action challenges – both when confronting the government on the battlefield 
and at the negotiation table (Lilja, 2010).  
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Pearlman (2010) warns that the assumption of a unitary actor with coherent preferences fails to 
account for the strategically inefficient or suboptimal use of violence. It may be useful to treat the 
group as a unitary actor for some purposes, for example when analyzing the military balance of a 
conflict, but this viewpoint should not divert from the fact that different actors and factions within 
the armed groups might have different perceptions and interests. By taking into account intra-group 
dynamics, this paper diverts from the assumption that groups act in a coherent and purposeful 
manner to achieve a well-defined set of goals. Instead, it adopts a composite actor approach that 
analyzes a group’s approach to negotiations as an evolving process in which different actors 
participate. For analytical purposes, the question of ‘why an armed group decides to negotiate’ must 
be disaggregated to “who within that movement does the choosing and how their choices influence 
those of others within their own community” (Pearlman, 2010, p. 198).  
1.3 Ripeness Theory 
The literature on conflict management emphasizes the idea of a conflict being 'ripe' for resolution. 
According to ripeness theory, parties are only willing to seek a negotiated exit when certain 
conditions are in place. While ripeness theory cannot predict the occurrence of negotiations, it 
attempts to explain “why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or 
others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiations” (Zartman, 2008, p. 232). 
Therefore, ripeness does not inevitably lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but it presents an 
opportunity to initiate a peace process. 
Conflicting parties have two basic strategic options for which they weigh the costs and benefits: the 
continuation of armed struggle and the attempt to resolve the conflict through negotiations 
(Zartman & Faure, 2011). Only when the conflicting party perceives that the net gains from a 
negotiated settlement exceed the opportunity costs, will it become open to seriously engaging in 
peace negotiations. When parties find themselves locked in an increasingly undesirable conflict, they 
are more inclined to seek an alternative policy such as negotiations, but they must still perceive a 
real opportunity in the negotiated agreement before they will genuinely seek negotiations. 
Hence, according to Zartman (2008), a ripe moment requires two elements: the conflicting parties’ 
perception of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ as well as the sense of a ‘way out’ through 
negotiations. Both of these elements necessarily include perceptions of the rebel group. There might 
be material referents of a mutually hurting stalemate, but it is only if the parties perceive the 
deadlock as well as the associated pain, that they will be receptive to alternatives to armed struggle. 
Similarly, the ‘way out’ refers to the parties’ subjective sense that a negotiated solution is possible 
(Zartman & de Soto, 2010). In reality, the distinction between material and subjective indicators is 
not always evident, but the conceptual differentiation is helpful when analyzing a conflict and 
seeking ways to promote a peace process. Given that an armed group’s conflict assessment is 
necessarily influenced by their perceptions, it is important for mediation practitioners to understand 
the dynamics that affect these perceptions.  
1.4 Negotiability 
Negotiability is an attempt to disaggregate ripeness theory by focusing on one actor. The concept of 
negotiability defines a situation in which a critical mass within a particular conflicting party 
considers negotiations as a desirable, legitimate and achievable alternative to armed struggle. 
Rather than a linear process or an explicit choice at one particular moment in time, negotiability 
represents an evolving social process involving the participation of different actors within a group 
(Pearlman 2010). An armed group can, at one point, genuinely consider the conflict negotiable, but 
as circumstances change, negotiability might be reversed.  
The basic concept of negotiability applies for all parties to a conflict. A ripe moment, and for that 
matter a negotiated solution, can only occur when all parties perceive the conflict as negotiable.  
A Time to Fight, and a Time to Talk? Negotiability of Armed Groups 
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Nonetheless, the circumstances under which an armed group will seek negotiations are somewhat 
different from those of a state. By considering carefully the perspective of armed groups, this paper 
attempts to contribute to the understanding of their perceptions when faced with the choice of 
whether to fight or to talk.  
Conceptually, negotiability is different from negotiations. Even when an armed group deems the 
conflict negotiable, negotiations may not necessarily occur, for example because the government is 
not willing to engage in negotiations. Also, armed groups might engage in negotiations for purely 
tactical reasons, to gain time or to acquire legitimacy, without considering negotiations as a viable 
strategic option. However, rebels might begin negotiations without seriously considering the conflict 
negotiable, but as a result of the process they may alter their perceptions in favor of negotiability.  
Stressing the difficulty of determining a particular group’s motivation, a mediation practitioner 
stated: “What is challenging to ascertain is why they are coming to the table, not whether or not 
they are coming at all”.1 As motivations are difficult to assess, this working paper proposes a 
differentiated framework to analyze the group’s approach to negotiations. Any non-state armed 
group can be situated on a spectrum of strategic positions, with a violent strategy at one end, and 
full cooperation with the government on the other. Thus, it is possible to distinguish three broad 
strategic positions (McCartney, 2005): First, militancy prevails when the group perceives violence as 
the only option and does not engage in cooperation with the opponent. Second, a mixed position is 
given when the armed group believes in the primacy of armed action but engages in cooperative 
behavior. This may be the case, for example, when rebels seek a pause in combat, which would 
allow them to recover and prepare for renewed fighting, or when under international or regional 
pressure to negotiate. Third, a position of negotiability implies that the armed group ultimately 
recognized political negotiations as the primary strategic option. However, even when a critical mass 
within the group considers the conflict negotiable, the group may still use violence for tactical 
purposes or as a result of internal splits. 
It is important to note that negotiability is not a static concept. As long as armed groups are subject 
to the militant paradigm, armed groups will not be willing to open the door to negotiations. 
However, when the appropriate conditions apply, the group will seek to discover what they can 
attain by cooperating. With a mixed strategy, the rebels might take a step forward to see what they 
are able to get at the negotiating table. While negotiability is not a prerequisite for negotiations, the 
fact that the group members engage in some cooperative behavior with the government 
presupposes some deeper change in their assessment of the conflict. The decision to genuinely seek 
a negotiated exit can take place ahead of the official negotiations with the government or during 
negotiations that have erstwhile been initiated for tactical reasons. A group’s experience of 
engaging with the government will influence their decision of whether to move further towards 
cooperation or to return to more violence. Although in most cases rebels keep their options open by 
simultaneously conducting a military campaign and preparing for negotiations, this paper argues 
that negotiability is more than an ad hoc decision. It is because of this that it is possible to develop 
the framework which will be outlined in the following section. 
 
______________________ 
1 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/a 
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2 Analytical Framework for Negotiability 
Two factors must be present for a rebel group to move towards negotiability: First, the group needs 
to perceive an irredeemable and painful status quo, the ‘hurting stalemate’, pushing them away 
from the combative strategy. The push away from the armed struggle makes negotiations desirable. 
Second, there has to be the prospect of a satisfactory agreement, the ‘way out’, pulling the armed 
group into negotiations. This pull shapes the perception of the negotiated exit as a legitimate and 
achievable alternative to the violent struggle. For analysis of the push and pull factors, it is essential 
to evaluate the material conditions on the ground as well as the armed group’s perceptions. 
The intra-group perspective is important when looking at the rebels’ perceptions. According to 
Lounsbery and Cook (2011), “a conflict is only ripe for negotiations when a sufficient number of 
people on each side are willing to compromise to avoid further bloodshed” (p. 74). Individuals and 
factions within the armed group might assess the material conditions in different ways and, 
therefore, draw diverging conclusions with regards to negotiability. For the rebels to consider the 
conflict as negotiable, a critical mass within the armed group must perceive the push and pull 
factors in a way that makes cooperation more desirable.  
Push factors are shaped by the interaction of the (i) military, (ii) political and (iii) economic 
dimensions of the conflict. It is important to analyze whether these dimensions add up to create a 
sufficient push away from the armed struggle. Correspondingly, three conditions determine the pull 
factors: (i) the compatibility of the peace process with the worldviews and political objectives of the 
group, (ii) the confidence in the government, and (iii) the trust in the negotiation process. 
Constructing the analytical framework, the following sections thus provide a detailed discussion of 
the push and pull factors and then examine the impact of different intra-group dynamics on the 
rebels’ approach to negotiations. 
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2.1 Push Factors 
Almost by definition, armed groups are established on the premise that the use of force is essential 
to achieve their ends. The group has taken the decision to engage in an armed struggle in order to 
rebel against the status quo. As long as the rebels believe that their objectives can be achieved 
through the use of force, they will have little incentive to negotiate. Thus, regardless of the 
insurgency’s goals, the susceptibility to negotiations presupposes some change in their strategic 
assessment of the conflict. When they are painfully locked into a conflict and are unable to escalate 
the violence to win a victory at an acceptable cost, the rebels are more receptive to considering 
alternatives to armed struggle (Zartman, 2008). Therefore, the stalemate, stipulating that the violent 
strategy will not succeed in achieving the maximalist goal of military triumph, and the associated 
hurt, which makes the current situation uncomfortable, are the central components of the push 
factor. 
In the literature on civil wars, there has been a growing realization that one-dimensional 
explanations are insufficient to discern complex phenomena. Wennmann (2009) illustrates that the 
interaction of the political, military and economic dimensions of the conflict shapes the incentive 
structures of armed groups. While the stalemate is primarily defined in military terms, the perception 
of pain is multifaceted and can be felt on the battleground, on the political front and in the wallet. 
The multidimensional character of a particular group’s perceptions requires a profound 
understanding of how the military, political and economic aspects of the armed struggle relate to 
each other. A mediation practitioner summarized the implications as follows: “When groups are 
being well funded and well supported, and when they have access to weapons, when they feel that 
they have the support of their own communities, and that they are making military gains, there is 
considerably less cause to talk”.2 
Discussing the different dimensions that contribute to the push factor, it is important to note that 
not a single dimension, but the cumulative effect of these dimension defines the push away from the 
armed conflict. For each dimension, this working paper proposes a number of questions that should 
provide some insight into the rebels’ perceptions of the hurting stalemate. Each question requires a 
careful distinction between material referents and subjective perceptions. 
2.1.1 Military dimension 
As long as a rebel group believes that the conflict can still be won through military means, the group 
is unlikely to consider negotiations as a possible alternative. Vice versa, if they have little hope of 
achieving a military victory, they are more likely to negotiate. This means that they are locked into a 
stalemate. Although political and economic matters play a role, the prospect of victory, or the lack 
thereof, is largely based on military considerations. While most armed groups are founded on the 
premise that they can achieve their objectives through violent means, the experience of military 
engagement may prove its futility. Zartman (2008) associates the stalemate with a plateau, “a flat 
and unending terrain without relief” (p. 232). A stalemate usually implies that no significant shifts in 
the military balance between the adversaries are occurring. In this regard, the failure to be able to 
escalate violence towards a victory contributes to the perception of the stalemate.  
However, even if a military victory is not possible on objective grounds, meaning that it is unrealistic 
that the armed group will achieve its overall goals through the force of arms, the armed group may 
still continue to pursue a militant strategy. There are three possible explanations: First, the rebels 
may not perceive that there is an impasse because they have an exaggerated assessment of their 
own military potential. Second, without the sense that a negotiated settlement is possible, the group  
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is left with no alternative to the armed struggle. Finally, if the stalemate is not sufficiently painful for 
the group, they may not perceive the need to reconsider their strategy.  
The military hurt associated with the stalemate centers on casualties, the loss of military installations 
and equipment, and the failure to recruit reliable combatants. Again, the appreciation of the military 
cost is largely subjective. For example, some commanders might consider severe casualties an 
acceptable sacrifice for a larger good, while others deem the escalating violence as detrimental for 
their group. Even when the group is sufficiently strong to resist the government, fatigue and despair 
among combatants often provide impetus for strategic reassessment. 
The following questions help to assess the military dimension of negotiability: 
• Is a military victory still possible? 
• Are any significant shifts in the military balance occurring? 
• Have there been attempts to escalate a way out of the stalemate? 
• Does the group experience significant and/or increasing casualties or losses of military 
equipment? Does the group have the possibility to recruit reliable combatants? Are there 
elements of fatigue and despair among the combatants?  
 
2.1.2 Political dimension 
Rebel groups are political actors whose logic goes beyond the mere realization of military activities. 
Therefore, political considerations can constitute a push away from violence. For many groups, the 
political consequences may even be more important for the assessment of the status quo than the 
military balance. In general, groups with a strong political rationale for interacting with the local 
population and the international community are more likely to consider negotiations as an 
alternative, because they give more weight to the sociopolitical repercussions of the violence. 
Common political considerations that work in favor of negotiations are increases in civilian 
causalities among the group’s constituency, pressure from the local population or the international 
community, and increased competition from other groups.  
Rebel groups are affected by two contradicting dynamics. On the one hand, rebel groups endeavor 
to build and maintain legitimacy among their rank-and-file, within the larger social setting as well as 
in the international arena. Legitimacy requires a certain belief by the target audience in the 
‘rightness’ of the group’s objectives and actions. A mediation practitioner describes the rebels’ quest 
for legitimacy as follows: “Most armed groups want to become the new government, so they are 
interested in gaining legitimacy. They want to show to their constituency that they are taking care of 
the population under their control, and they have an interest to engage with credible international 
actors”.3 
Like any other social actor, rebel groups are loss adverse. Therefore, the loss of legitimacy and 
political support, or the fear thereof, pushes them away from a militant strategy. Cronin (2008) finds 
that “groups are more likely to compromise if their popular support is waning” (p. 6). A group might 
be loosing support because the local population deems the violence unbearable and looses 
confidence in the armed struggle. Hence, rebel groups with a strong local support base are 
susceptible to pressures emanating from its constituency. Rebel group may also be concerned about 
the fate of civilians, incorporating the suffering of civilians into their own perception of pain. 
However, when a group feels that the continuation of the armed  struggle is politically beneficial, it  
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will be less likely to consider alternatives to the violent strategy. Sometimes the constituency is more 
militant than the leadership. In this case, the leaders might hold back on negotiations until they can 
bring their constituents along. According to a mediator practitioner, “When the constituency does 
not see the armed struggle as an alternative, they can exert pressure on the group; but there are 
also situations when the group’s elite is more moderate and they must find ways to bring the 
constituency along”.4 
The quest for appeal at the international level often originates from the group’s need for political 
and in some cases economic support. Furthermore, most rebel groups are instinctively aware of the 
broader historic context in which they operate. Popular ideas about the state, economics, and 
human aspirations have an impact on the rebels’ assessment of the local conflict. Groups whose 
cause is no longer in the ascendancy on the international stage are more likely to perceive a lack of 
utility of an armed struggle (Cronin, 2008). While not a sufficient condition for negotiations, pressure 
from international actors or a changing international context therefore has an impact on 
negotiability. Nonetheless, external pressure does not always work in favor of negotiations. Some 
states use armed groups as proxies in their quest to destabilize another country. It is important to 
ask ‘who’ has an influence on the armed group and ‘how’ this influence may affect the group’s 
conflict assessment.  
On the other hand, a violent strategy counters legitimacy, as it fosters a disconnection between a 
rebel group and the local population as well as the international community. The practice of violence 
tends to have a de-legitimizing effect (Schlichte, 2009). Rebels might originally have maintained 
strong ties with the local population, but their isolated existence as combatants, repressive tactics 
and financial self-sufficiency may lead to an increased detachment from its support base. 
Furthermore, if armed groups subsist in social contexts in which they are not deeply rooted, they do 
not have a relationship with the population that is close enough to allow them to collect the 
information needed for selective violence. Hence, there is an incentive to use indiscriminate violence 
in order to establish control (Kalyvas, 2006). This alienates the group even further. Evidently, if the 
group functions in a disconnected manner from the local population, the civilian cost of violence and 
local pressure for negotiations have far less impact. Groups that are isolated from public support are 
less like to renege on armed violence (Conciliation Resources, 2009). 
The interaction of these dynamics, the delegitimizing effect of violence on the one hand and the 
quest to build legitimacy on the other, is decisive. Thus, the way in which armed groups engage with 
their sociopolitical context indicates how painful the group might consider the current situation to 
be. In the words of a mediation practitioner: “A group that retains a lot of soft power is more 
amendable to negotiations than a group that relies largely on hard power“.5 
In addition to these dynamics, the number of competing rebel groups also has an impact on the 
group’s political calculus. A multiparty setting provides groups, especially weaker groups, with 
incentives to negotiate. These groups might prefer to be the first signatory to an agreement in order 
to avoid increased government reprisals after other groups have laid down their arms, and to ensure 
inclusion in any peace dividends (Nilsson, 2010). 
The following questions help to assess the political dimension of negotiability: 
• Does the group have broad support among the local population? If yes, does the group’s 
constituency suffer from the ongoing conflict? Does the local population support a militant 
strategy? 
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• Does the group seek recognition and support at the international level? If yes, is there 
pressure from international actors to end the conflict? 
• Does the group face competition from other armed groups? If yes, what is the group’s 
relative political and military strength compared to the other groups? 
 
2.1.3 Economic dimension 
The economic dimension of the push factor pertains to the means through which armed groups 
finance their operations and the extent to which resource-generating activities affect the group’s 
interests and reasoning. Groups are pushed away from a violent strategy when they face financial 
difficulties and have no economic stake in the continuation of the violence. 
The relative importance of the armed groups’ economic motives has been subject to intense debate 
among scholars and practitioners. Based on the empirical results of their widely discussed study, 
Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that economic variables related to the viability of rebellion provide 
significant explanatory power. Accordingly, civil war is a function of greed, fueled by the abundance 
of natural resources and the relatively low life chances of potential rebels. In turn, they consider that 
political ‘grievances’ are insignificant to explain the existence of armed groups. This argument has 
since been questioned repeatedly on empirical and methodological grounds (Arnson and Zartman, 
2005; Weinstein, 2007; O’Leary and Silke, 2007; Boix, 2008). These critiques state that political 
motivations do matter for understanding the emergence and perpetuation of insurgencies, and thus 
suggest that a more convincing model for the study of armed rebellion considers both political 
motivation and opportunity (Boix, 2008). 
Rebels need some form of reliable financing and support to sustain armed struggle against the 
government. Some groups may transform into semi-criminal enterprises, engaged in drug trafficking 
and other criminal activities with the aim of supporting the armed action. Since rebel groups are 
illegal they are likely to finance themselves by illegal means (O’Leary and Silke, 2007). However, 
combat-specific moral and organizational structures cannot be upheld exclusively by material 
incentives. Sustained insurgencies require more than financial rewards to recruit and retain their 
rank-and-file. Rents can even hamper the political and military success of a group, as they are 
determined by shorter-term aims and may cause tensions with the support base (Gutiérrez Sanín, 
2008). 
While greed alone does not govern rebels’ motivation, economic factors still have an important 
impact. Opportunities and constraints of financing affect armed groups’ strategy and organization 
(Weinstein, 2007, p. 34-53). Most rebel groups rely on various sources to finance their activities and 
adjust in case a particular method becomes inoperative. As economic structures and incentives 
change during a war, so do the ways in which rebel groups maintain themselves (Schlichte, 2009, p. 
117). Production of agricultural goods and the extortion of diaspora groups are means of financing 
insurgencies, as are lootable resources, criminal activities or external assistance (Walter, 2009, p. 
248). Nevertheless, Schlichte (2009) cautions: “Even rich endowments cannot prevent armed groups’ 
failure if they do not exercise control over the delegitimizing effect of violence” (p. 142). 
Wennmann (2009) finds that self-financing conflicts are less prone to peace agreements. In such a 
scenario, a stalemate can be mutually beneficial rather than mutually hurting; ceasefires or peace 
agreements might even compromise profit-seeking activities. According to Zartman (2004) ‘soft, 
stable, and self-serving stalemate’ does not create sufficient pain and pressure for the potentially 
risky option of a negotiated solution. Moreover, armed groups that adopt violent predatory and rent-
seeking practices experience delegitimization, which in turn alienates them further from their 
political support bases (Schlichte, 2009). 
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In general, a rebel group with multiple sources of financing and a high degree of financial self-
sufficiency feels less desire to engage in a peace process. Furthermore, when armed groups have 
developed rent-seeking behavior over the course of the conflict, they are less interested in a 
negotiated solution (Wennmann, 2009; Dudouet, 2010). On the other hand, lacking financial means 
to sustain a military strategy pushes the group away from militancy towards more cooperative 
means.  
The following questions help to assess the economic dimension of negotiability: 
• Is the group able to generate resources to sustain the combative strategy? Are there rising 
financial costs of the conflict? 
• Is the group financially self-sufficient? Does it rely on a foreign sponsor? 
• Does the group have multiple sources of financing? Are these sources sustainable? 
• Does the group exhibit strong rent-seeking behavior? 
 
Box 1: Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – A strong push away from an unpromising 
armed struggle 
Concentrated in central Mindanao in the southern Philippines, the MILF is the country’s largest rebel 
movement. With significant public support in its areas of deployment, the group has a military 
capacity of an estimated 12,000 combatants (Santos & Santos, 2010). Its main sources of funding 
are zakat collection (obligatory alms of Muslims) and extortion. Other sources include some foreign 
sponsors, remittances from overseas workers, smuggling activities, and diversion of funds from 
Islamic NGOs (Santos & Santos, 2010; ICG, 2008). Without access to large reservoirs of lootable 
resources, the group’s sources of financing remain limited. 
Since its establishment in the mid-1980s, the MILF has alternated between armed struggle and 
negotiations with the Philippine government. Several periods of large-scale hostilities with the 
government, in particular in 2000, 2003 and 2008, reinforced the realization within the MILF that “it 
can neither win nor be defeated militarily” (Santos, 2010, p. 77). The MILF leadership also 
recognized that continued hostilities mainly result in suffering among Muslim communities in its 
heartland. Maintaining close links with these communities, the MILF has also been strongly 
influenced by the hope of a large majority of the Moro population for a political solution (Cook & 
Collier, 2006). Moreover, the post-9/11 discourse on terrorism affected the group’s calculus, 
demonstrating the need to clearly dissociate itself from terrorist groups and tactics to avoid 
international condemnation and aggression from U.S. operatives (Taylor, 2010). 
Despite backlashes in the peace process and some internal dissent, the MILF remains committed to 
negotiating an end to the conflict. Hence, aware of its limited resources and the vulnerability of its 
constituencies, the MILF perceives a strong push away from an unpromising armed struggle. 
 
2.2 Pull Factors 
Negotiations require personal contact and cooperation with the opponent, political openness, and 
some ideological flexibility, all of which armed groups tend to reject at the moment of their 
establishment (McCartney, 2004). Without the perception of negotiations as a workable option, an 
armed group might suffer from a painful deadlock, but it has no viable alternative to the 
continuation of  violence. In addition to the realization  that the armed  struggle is  detrimental,  the  
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rebels must therefore recognize negotiations with the enemy as a potential way out. The hurting 
stalemate “is the necessary if insufficient condition of negotiations” (Zartman, 2008, p. 236). To 
produce a negotiated settlement, a hurting stalemate needs to be accompanied by pull factors. The 
following section considers three interconnected elements that must to be in place for an armed 
group to consider a negotiated exit legitimate and achievable: A peace process has to be compatible 
with the group’s worldview and interests, and the group requires some basic confidence in the 
government as a negotiating partner as well as trust in the negotiation process.  
2.2.1 Compatibility 
When a group does not see a potential peace agreement to be in line with its basic interests, it will 
not seriously pursue a negotiated solution. It is not a case of whether a rebel group perceives that all 
of its goals will be met in a peace agreement, but rather that it is able to perceive negotiations as a 
legitimate action and have a sense that its interests can be addressed in a satisfactory way at the 
negotiating table. Often a change in perception can bring compatibility, but “when the basic 
interests of the conflicting parties are too far apart, negotiation may not make sense”.6  
Stuck in an armed struggle, ideologically committed and demonizing their enemy, armed groups are 
often unable to conceive of negotiations as an alternative (Ashour, 2007). Rebel movements often 
adhere to worldviews that frame the conflict in structural terms, centered on inequalities regarding 
the distribution of wealth and power between the center and its peripheries. Such an analysis 
commonly postulates the need for regime change through the use of force, excluding the possibility 
of negotiations with the government. A process of ideological moderation is thus required for the 
group members to give negotiations a chance. This process of moderation, or de-radicalization, 
should include a shift in the underlying assumptions of the group so they can appreciate potential 
gains to be made from negotiations (McCartney, 2004; Haysom, 2005).  
Moderation requires internal debate. However, the lowering of barriers to negotiations is a long-
term process that varies considerably depending on the characters of the group’s leaders and the 
nature of the group. A precise analysis of this potentially reversible process is very difficult for 
outsiders and needs to be gauged as it progresses (Zartman & Faure, 2011, pp. 283-284). From an 
external perspective, the group’s moderation might be observed through the prevalence of a positive 
vision for the future, instead of a negative concept about what they do not want to happen 
(McCartney, 2005). 
Even when a group is not categorically opposed to talks with the government, it must also sense 
that its political objectives may be advanced in a peace process. Negotiations can only become an 
alternative when the rebels perceive their objectives to be negotiable. A complete revision of the 
rebels’ motivations is neither possible nor necessary, but some flexibility is required for the paradigm 
shift towards negotiability to occur (Beaulieu, 2010). As compatibility naturally includes a strong 
element of perception, the analysis in this regard must consider the distinction between the interests 
and the positions of the group (Fisher & Ury, 1981). While long held positions are often not 
conducive to a peace process, the underlying interests might still be addressed satisfactorily in the 
talks. Only when the rebels reconsider their positions, might they be able to see that their objectives 
can be compatible with a peace process. For example, a group that claims independence might not 
consider negotiations as a promising way to achieve their goal. However, autonomy arrangements 
might be a possible topic in negotiations with the government. While a dogmatic position is static 
and therefore not conducive to negotiations, a political argumentation allows for more flexibility in 
reassessing  long-held positions. Alvaro de Soto  argues: “If a group is quintessentially political, then  
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the armed bit is really almost technical. And, if they do not have a political logic, there is not much 
to negotiate about.”7 
When analyzing a group’s approach to negotiations, it is important to not only look at the group as 
a whole, but to also consider the needs and fears of individual members. The personal interests of 
the group’s leaders play a role in any negotiations with the government. A mediation practitioner 
highlights this point: “Commanders are worried about the image of their group and their image as 
political leaders”.8 Besides reputational issues, there are various other interests: the desire for a 
certain lifestyle, economic interests, political ambitions, and the avoidance of legal prosecution. In 
most cases, at least some of these interests can be addressed as part of a peace process. 
Considering political realities on the national and international level, however, certain personal 
interests, such as a blanket amnesty for war crimes, may not be negotiable. While International 
efforts to promote accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, as well as 
legal proscription of suspected terrorist organizations, might deter armed groups from committing 
crimes, they may also inhibit a transformation towards negotiability (Bell 2006). Proscription regimes 
can even fuel radicalism by strengthening hard-liners within the group (Dudouet, 2007). On similar 
lines, a mediation practitioner warns: “The labeling of terror groups is counterproductive for 
negotiations, because once you are labeled as a terrorist, you have nothing to loose”.9 Generally, as 
insurgent leaders consider possible negative consequences for themselves when contemplating the 
decision to negotiate, they are more likely to engage in negotiations when they see that their future 
personal situation is open to discussion (Zartman & Alfredson, 2010). 
The following questions help to assess the compatibility of rebels’ worldviews with negotiations: 
• Is the prospective framework for negotiations with the government compatible with the 
basic tenants of the group’s worldview? 
• Can the group’s principal political objectives be addressed in a satisfactory way in 
negotiations? 
• Has there been a moderation of goals or a dropping of preconditions for negotiations? 
Does the armed group recognize the government’s needs and aims? 
• How are rebel leaders’ personal needs affected by peace negotiations? 
 
Box 2: Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) – Gradually changing positions 
Established in December 1969, the Provisional IRA became the strongest Irish republican 
paramilitary organization. After the group restored a ceasefire in July 1997, Sinn Féin, its political 
wing, was admitted into all-party negotiations that concluded in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
of 1998.  
Although many Irish Republicans were gradually loosing hope in a military victory during the 1980s, 
at first they did not perceive negotiations as a promising option either. They knew that the group’s 
principal political objective, to remove Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and to realize a 
united Ireland, could not be achieved in peace negotiations with London. As a result of its militant 
history, the IRA considered negotiations as betrayal of their cause (Bell, 2000). 
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Hence, the endgame in Northern Ireland required a long process of changed perceptions, during 
which the British appear less and less evil, and the need for cooperation with the Protestant 
Unionists was recognized. Over time, the Republicans began properly to assess the full recalcitrance 
of Unionists toward the idea of a unitary Ireland as well as the increasing indifference in the newly 
prosperous Ireland (Bell, 2000; Moloney, 2002). 
Secret negotiations were spearheaded by Sinn Féin and supported by some members of the IRA’s 
Army Council, but the slowly emerging consensus within the larger IRA lagged behind (Bell, 2000). 
In 1988, the Army Council took the undisclosed decision to relax its demand for a rapid withdrawal 
of British troops. Also, the categorical resistance to a ceasefire was slowly abandoned. Prior to the 
1994 ceasefire, elements within the IRA managed to put in place a convincing political strategy, 
which by then was consistent with the movement’s basic analysis (McCartney, 2004). During this 
period, Sinn Féin gradually replaced the IRA as the Republican’s preferred means of struggle 
(O’Leary, 2007, p. 220). 
The ambiguity of the peace process permitted a phased reassessment of the conflict and long-held 
doctrines (Moloney, 2002). Eventually “political agents inside and outside the republican movement 
persuaded sufficient IRA leaders, volunteers and prisoners that a peace process […] was the best 
way to advance the IRA’s objectives” (O’Leary, 2007, p. 221). Marjorie “Mo” Mowlam (2005), the 
British negotiator, explains that Sinn Féin had to consult regularly with the broader movement to 
assure support for its decisions.  
Recognizing the futility of a painful armed struggle, Republican leaders were willing to look for 
viable alternatives. However, dogmatic positions had to be changed and the militant rank-and-file 
persuaded that the negotiations were the right path to take. Only when the positions became 
compatible with a negotiated exit did they feel that there was a sufficient pull towards negotiations.  
 
2.2.2 Confidence in the government’s willingness and capacity 
Mistrust is an intrinsic feature in the interaction between conflicting parties. However, a minimum 
level of confidence is required for any party to consider the conflict negotiable. Confidence goes 
beyond the ideological compatibility of negotiations discussed above. While the armed groups must 
consider cooperation in line with their worldview, they must also sense that the government is 
willing to negotiate in good faith and has the capacity to implement a possible agreement 
(Lounsbery & Cook, 2011).  
Because of the prevalence of deceiving maneuvers in civil wars, rebels are never completely 
confident in the government’s willingness to solve the conflict peacefully. Looking at information 
problems, Walter (2009a) finds that it is more difficult for armed groups to acknowledge the 
government’s commitment in situations of power asymmetries and when third-party intervention is 
unlikely. Especially when the rebel’s constituency is weak in relation to the overall population, the 
group fears that the government will exploit a collaborative strategy. They tend to be suspicious 
regarding the government’s strategy, which translates into the assumption that the government uses 
the negotiations to weaken the armed component of the rebel movement. The rebels are also 
mindful of the government’s inherent interest in preserving sovereignty. In separatist conflicts in 
particular, armed groups are aware of the strategic incentives of governments to be tough in order 
to deter potential future challengers (Walter, 2009b).  
Moreover, the legacy of previous bad faith negotiations is an important barrier to the group’s 
perception of negotiability (Haysom, 2005, p. 86). Rebels are prone to incorporate negative past 
experiences when analyzing the government’s strategy and future behavior. When previous 
negotiations  have  broken  down or a  peace  agreement has  not been  implemented  satisfactorily,  
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rebels will likely attribute responsibility to the government and, therefore, be more hesitant to 
commence a new peace process.  
Despite the obvious difficulties, rebel groups that recognize a push away from the armed conflict 
search for reassurance that the other side has also moved away from a ‘winning mentality’ 
(McCartney, 2004). They often aspire to a situation in which they have sufficient political and 
military clout to negotiate. Essentially, they are looking for signs that the government recognizes the 
damage caused by the present situation and shares with them a basic understanding of what the 
conflict is about. The way the government reaches out to the population is particularly important in 
this respect. Moreover, confidence-building measures, such as the unilateral release of prisoners or 
other humanitarian acts, provide the armed group with a reference point (Mason & Siegfried, 
forthcoming 2012). A genuine and credible conciliatory gesture, signaling the government’s 
willingness to talk, can be an important gesture for increasing the trustworthiness of the other side 
(Mitchell, 2007). Also, “a message is credible depending on who it is delivered from. For example, 
when more high-level representatives of the executive branch and the armed forces join the process, 
the messages become more credible. The public image of the government is more at stake when 
high-level representatives are involved”.10  
Similarly, rebels see recognition by the government and the international community as an important 
prerequisite for negotiations. For them, recognition is an essential step towards the 
acknowledgement of their grievances and, as such, it builds some confidence towards the enemy. 
Recognition signals to the armed group that the potential government negotiators will consider 
them as a party at the negotiating table and are willing to discuss the group’s political goals. 
Beyond the willingness of the government to negotiate, the rebels evaluate their counterparts’ 
capacity to implement a potential agreement. The balance of power within the government side is 
essential for the rebel group to build confidence. For example, even when the head of the 
government is genuinely interested in a negotiated exit, opposition from economic or military elites 
can still jeopardize a peace agreement. Armed groups therefore emphasize the government’s ability 
to deter potential spoilers within its own ranks (DeRouen et al., 2010).  
The following questions help to assess the confidence factor of negotiability: 
• Does the government have an interest in reaching a sustainable peace agreement? Does 
the government have an incentive to deter potential future challengers? 
• Does the government recognize the armed group as a legitimate interlocutor? 
• Is there a history of failed negotiations? 
• Is the government sufficiently strong and representative to engage in negotiations and to 
implement a peace agreement? Can the government control potential spoilers within its 
own ranks? 
• Is there a commitment from the international community to help implement a possible 
peace agreement? 
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Box 3: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) – Perceiving a negotiated 
solution as suicide 
Between 1998 and 2002, the FARC negotiated with the government under President Andrés 
Pastrana, but with continuous interruptions and violent incidents, the process hardly made any 
headway. While the FARC formally committed to the negotiations, it remained questionable whether 
the group had genuinely considered the conflict negotiable. In February 2002, peace talks collapsed 
when the FARC hijacked an airplane with the President of the Senate Peace Commission. 
A coalition of rural self-defense forces at its origin, the FARC became the country’s strongest 
insurgent group, gradually transforming into an ideological peasant guerrilla movement with the 
aim of overthrowing the ‘oligarchic state’ and implementing far-reaching socio-economic reforms 
(Chernick, 2007). In 1989, the FARC officially recognized a negotiated settlement as a possibility. 
The group’s objective of taking political power at the national level, which could not realistically be 
addressed in negotiations, was not altered. Remarkably consistent in its demands, there were little 
signs of moderation in the run-up to the negotiations (Chernick, 2009). Not appointing a permanent 
negotiation team, the FARC showed little confidence in negotiations. 
Many in the FARC believed that an agreement ending with their disarmament was the equivalent of 
signing a suicide pact (ICG, 2002, p. 27). Previous efforts to moderate their means had failed: As a 
result of a ceasefire agreement in 1984, the FARC established a political wing, the Unión Patriótica, 
whose members were virtually exterminated by paramilitary forces. The memory of the Unión 
Patriótica remained a powerful disincentive for the FARC to engage in a serious peace process.  
The FARC leaders might have trusted President Pastrana, but the group also saw him as isolated, 
without the capacity to bring the elites and the armed forces along (Castro Ruz, 2008). In view of 
the continuous presence of the paramilitary threat and the government’s negotiations with the 
United States to significantly increase military aid, the FARC distrusted its opponent’s willingness to 
solve the conflict by means of negotiations (Chernick, 2009).  
With a relatively comfortable financial situation and largely alienated from the local population, the 
group made an exaggerated assessment of their military capacity (González Posso, 2009). In the 
absence of a strong push way from its militant logic and a meaningful pull into a more cooperative 
strategy, the conclusion is apparent that the FARC did not genuinely engaged in negotiations to end 
the conflict. 
 
2.2.3 Trust in the negotiation process 
Negotiations entail risks for armed groups. Rebels often believe that cooperation with the opponent 
is futile and potentially undermines the armed struggle (Conciliation Resources, 2009). A mediation 
practitioner argues: “Armed groups are used to concentrating on military matters and they are 
initially quite at unease with the idea of negotiation. They have the feeling that they are being 
brought into something they do not know”.11 Rebels are often concerned about being pulled into an 
unacceptable agreement, thereby compromising their fundamental principles and losing support. 
Thus, armed groups will only engage in negotiations if they are assured that they will retain some 
control of the process (McCartney, 2004). 
Typically, rebels have less experience and expertise in diplomatic affairs and negotiations than the 
government. As a result, they may not understand the structure, pace and process of negotiations. 
Gorman and le Sage (2008) argue that this lack of capacity fosters mistrust with regards to peaceful 
conflict resolution. Consequently, rebels are more likely to engage when they know the process and 
are  aware of  their  negotiation  skills (Haysom, 2005, p. 89).  Specific  expertise on  relevant issues,  
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such as power sharing or the administration of natural resources, also increases trust in the 
negotiating process.  
The educational background of the group’s leaders affects their perception of the negotiation 
process: “Rebel leaders who are well educated are more likely to be confident about their ability to 
reach a satisfactory agreement in complex negotiations”.12 Another mediation practitioner states it 
in the following way: “A good commander on the ground is not necessarily a good negotiator”.13 
Furthermore, “logistical and security concerns are an important factor for a group to attend peace 
negotiations”.14 The rebels are worried about the security of their representatives during the 
negotiating process and about the logistics of maintaining contact between the negotiators and the 
rest of the group. Only when the rebels feel comfortable with the logistical arrangements will they 
be willing to participate in negotiations. 
The following questions serve to assess trust in the negotiation process: 
• Does the group have representative interlocutors who could play a leading role in the 
peace process? 
• Does the group have previous experience in diplomatic affairs and negotiations? 
• Are there significant power asymmetries between the armed group and the government?  
• Has the group engaged in preparations for negotiations? 
• What is the educational background of group leaders? 
• Does the group have clearly formulated political objectives? 
 
2.3 Intra-Group Processes 
For an armed group to turn towards negotiability, momentum must be built within the group. 
Material referents of a hurting stalemate might be in place, but negotiability is only given when a 
sufficient number of decision-makers perceive the push and pull factors as favoring negotiations, 
allowing them to bring their rank-and-file along. Applying a composite actor approach, it is 
important to take into account the nature of the group as well as its decision-making dynamics. A 
mediation practitioner observes: “The toughest negotiations are not so much about reaching an 
understanding with the other side at the negotiating table; it is usually about getting everybody on 
board who needs to be on board”.15  
Armed groups face similar problems of communication, coordination and funding as other actors. 
However, some of the dynamics originate in the fact that they employ violence as a means to 
attaining power (Schlichte, 2009). Although internal structures and processes are unique to each 
group,  certain  general  dynamics  can be  distinguished  to make  sense of  decision-making. While  
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gathering information about intra-group processes and interpreting them is not an easy task, the 
general patterns described below provide some insights into the forces at work.  
2.3.1 Decision-making structures 
Based on their ideology and the contextual constraints, armed groups develop specific 
organizational arrangements. A group’s structure gives an indication of the relationship between 
leaders and followers. These structures shape the possibilities for internal debate and determine the 
processes of decision-making. Shifts in the approach towards negotiations seldom depend on a 
single individual, but on “the balance of arguments […] that at any one time favor the analysis of 
one or other group within the movement” (McCartney, 2004). However, the decision-making 
structure guides this balance of arguments and the prospect of cognitive change within the group. 
McCartney (2004) distinguishes three broad categories of decision-making processes: an individual 
with absolute authority, like Prabhakaran, the deceased leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE); a corporate leadership with supreme authority for policy decisions, as in the case of 
the IRA Army Council or the FARC Secretariat; and a decentralized structure, where operational units 
have direct responsibility for their action. However, groups with a strong central authority usually 
include some mechanisms for consultation with their members, allowing for different perspectives to 
compete for influence, and decentralized organizations have some policy guidance from the center. 
Thus interactions are never exclusively ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ (Pearlman, 2010, p. 202). 
Armed groups endeavor to ensure that lines of authority within the group are clear and respected. 
They usually require members to emphasize loyalty and to pledge allegiance to the movement’s 
cause, while at the same time enforcing strict internal discipline. Challenges to the leadership or its 
strategic direction are usually repressed. Moreover, the decision-making structures are often closed 
and sustained interaction with outsiders is prevented. Therefore, rebels are prone to ‘groupthink’, 
which poses the danger that potentially erroneous assessments and misjudgments are reinforced 
among the members (Janis, 1972). This affects their analysis of the context and may obstruct the 
rational assessment of strategic options. 
However, for a transformation towards negotiability to take place, there needs to be some flexibility. 
Only when elements within the group can question the assumptions that have guided the group’s 
strategy, will there be a possibility of change (McCartney, 2004). In general, the more open the 
decision-making structures are, the more likely it is that the group will assesses the push and full 
factors in a pragmatic and objective manner. A change towards more flexible and open structures 
tends to be gradual, triggered by internal changes and supported through interaction with outsiders. 
2.3.2 Strength of leadership 
Rebel leaders encounter immense challenges in building a momentum for strategic reassessment 
within a group. Philipson (2005) argues that rebel leaders have more flexibility in their decision-
making than governments, because they are not constrained by rule-bound bureaucracies and 
internal and international accountability. Nevertheless, as a result of ideological rigidity and closed 
decision-making structures, the leadership might find it difficult to present unpalatable realities and 
strategic changes to their rank-and-file. 
Cooperation and negotiations with the adversary are more risky in the case of leadership 
competition within the group. A mediation practitioner comments: “One thing that I have often seen 
in these processes is that it can come down to personality politics. Petty things can be a serious 
hindrance for the unity of the group”.16 Political and economic interests vary among different group  
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members. When defining a strategy vis-à-vis the government, rebel leaders are likely to be 
bargaining over the classic ‘who gets what, when, and how’ (Pearlman, 2010, p. 202). 
In order to move towards negotiability, the group requires leaders that have the legitimacy and the 
authority to advocate for a strategic shift. While a strong leadership can inhibit the group from 
considering negotiations as an alternative, the strength of leadership is also an important condition 
for consolidating the willingness to negotiate (Beaulieu, 2010). Softliners often find it more difficult 
to “carry the body politic into a change of policy” (Zartman & de Soto, 2010, p. 15), as they are 
more vulnerable to charges of selling out to the enemy. A strong leadership is able to persuade their 
followers and neutralize internal spoilers who disrupt efforts in favor of negotiability. When there is 
leadership competition, it is important to look at the different interests and arguments, as well as 
the relative power of the different actors within the group. 
2.3.3 Change of leadership 
The replacement of a hardliner within the leadership might indicate the group’s recognition of 
negotiability. When group members sense a push away from the armed conflict, they are more likely 
to advocate for a leader representing a more moderate policy. A more moderate leader can also be 
at the origin of the transformation towards negotiability. Hence, a change of leadership can both be 
a sign of a strategic shift within the group and a factor promoting such a shift. 
In certain cases, the presence of a militant leader may be the primary obstacle to negotiability. 
Therefore, the death or replacement of this leader can increase the likelihood of negotiations. Yet, 
the change of leadership may also result in a more diffuse organization, lacking a strong leader to 
promote negotiations. New leaders, even if they are more moderate, often adopt antagonistic 
stances in order to consolidate their position within the group before attempting to steer the group 
towards negotiations. It is thus important to analyze the reasons behind strategic changes in armed 
groups, with a particular focus on the constraints and opportunities encountered by the new 
leadership. 
2.3.4 Fragmentation 
Armed groups face particular collective action challenges when trying to accommodate different 
positions. Intra-group fragmentation is commonly viewed as an obstacle to negotiations (Nathan, 
2006). The transformation towards negotiability entails risks related to information asymmetries and 
commitment challenges at the intra-group level (Lilja, 2010, p. 22). Discord over the question of 
negotiability can even lead to the splintering of rebel groups into factions that support the 
negotiations and those that do not. Thus, leaders are naturally cautious about advocating for a 
paradigm change, and this affects their own approach to negotiations (McCartney, 2005, p. 32).  
While consolidation is important for both armed struggle and negotiations, these processes are not 
necessarily the same. The conduct of military struggle requires the mobilization of constituents who 
are in some form dissatisfied with the status quo, whereas negotiations demand the followers’ 
confidence that their leaders can bring about positive change. Leaders or factions arguing in favor of 
negotiations are likely to encounter spoilers within their groups, who may articulate maximalist 
goals, the need for a higher level of security, and a complete disbelief in the other side (Stedman, 
1997). A small number of internal spoilers can thus disrupt engagement processes. The challenge of 
negotiability is to arrive at a situation where the majority of members support the negotiation 
strategy, while at the same time deterring opponents of negotiations (Lilja, 2010; Cunningham, 
2006). 
A strategic shift towards negotiations is most probable when the group has a robust organizational 
structure. When armed groups are strong and cohesive, they can enforce compliance with their 
constituents (Cronin, 2008; Dudouet, 2010). Weak and fractured movements, on the other hand, 
may not be able to seize possibilities for negotiations. 
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2.3.5 Internal communication 
The possibility of sustaining internal communication is important for the transition towards 
negotiability. Building a critical mass for negotiations requires debate among the group leaders as 
well as between the leaders and their rank-and-file (Haysom, 2005). A mediation practitioner 
explains: “The advice that I always give to rebel groups is that they must continue to consult with 
people that disagree with them and continue these lines of communication within their own 
structures”.17 However, in a certain geographic and political environment, the group might lack the 
organizational and technological means to maintain continuous internal communication, which in 
turn may inhibit debates that are necessary for a shift towards negotiability. In particular, when the 
group operates in remote and dispersed locations, government forces with technological superiority 
over the rebels may disturb means of communication. 
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3 The Role of Third Parties 
As an evolving social process, negotiability is influenced by internal as well as external factors. Third 
parties can have an important role in fostering negotiability. This chapter thus discusses the 
relationship between third-party efforts and the rebels’ perception of negotiability. Against this 
background, it suggests a general approach for how to prepare an effective engagement strategy.  
3.1 Third-Party Engagement and Negotiability 
In negotiation theory third parties are not considered direct participants in the negotiations, but their 
role is to assist the conflicting parties in reaching an agreement (Hopmann, 1996). Nevertheless, 
third-party engagement is an important previous step to official negotiations: “Mediation is not the 
six months of the Addis talks or the forty-one days in Kenya. It is a lot of the stuff that happens 
before that”.18 
For the purpose of this paper, engagement is defined as the interaction between third parties and 
armed groups with the goal of conversing, carrying messages, advising and facilitating (Whitfield, 
2010). Apart from the formal mediator that usually engages rebel groups around official 
negotiations, there are other third parties, including local civil society, non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations and states, that can get involved outside the context of 
formal talks with the aim of stimulating negotiability. Third-party engagement with armed groups 
takes place prior to and during formal negotiations. 
Negotiability should not be considered a precondition for engagement. In fact, “engagement with 
the outside world is almost always a healthy thing for armed groups”.19 Nevertheless, third parties 
must be aware that armed groups might seek engagement for purely tactical reasons, in which case 
third-party actors need to be careful not to promote a peace process that is doomed to fail. A 
mediation practitioner emphasizes this point: “Our default position is ‘we will always engage’, 
because engaging is different from negotiating. Engagement means meeting the actor and trying to 
understand if they are interested in negotiations. It does not hurt. Though, if they are very malicious 
and they want to exploit the process, you have to decide whether you want to promote a 
negotiation process”.20 Stressing the importance and utility of early and continued engagement, 
another mediation practitioner argues: “Even if the group uses the engagement to gain time, third 
parties should maintain the contact. If you just wait until they are ready, you miss the entrance to 
the process. Through engagement with third parties, rebel groups might be pulled into the logic of 
negotiations”.21 
Engagement with armed actors is a delicate affair. A process must be carefully designed for it to 
support negotiability. Also, there are different styles of engagement. In certain cases, third parties 
use their power to compel the insurgents to negotiate, thus “pushing and pulling them away from 
conflict and into resolution” (Touval & Zartman, 2001, p. 436). The presence of a powerful third 
party that is willing to use its muscle in favor of a peace process can promote ripeness, but it can 
also make a peaceful resolution of the conflict more difficult by undermining the rebels’ trust in a 
process. In this regard, it is important to note that external pressure can be critical but it is not a 
panacea for bringing armed groups to the negotiating table (Haysom, 2005, p. 86).  
When the reservations of the conflict parties are not taken into account, a peace process can do 
more harm than good. Even a well-intended engagement can lead to a splintering of groups, which  
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in turn may lead to an increase in the use of violence (Lounsbery & Cook, 2011). For example, in the 
case of the Abuja negotiations in 2005-06 between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels, 
externally imposed deadlines undermined the negotiation process and amplified the fragmentation 
of the rebel movements (Nathan, 2006). The legacy of failed negotiations or ineffective agreements 
may constitute serious impediments for future conflict resolution attempts. 
Third-party involvement can also strengthen the rebels’ resolve to pursue a combative strategy. It 
has been argued that armed groups factor in the possibility of international engagement, leading 
them to either increase armed action or stall negotiations in order to provoke third-party 
intervention (Kuperman 2008). A frequently cited example in this regard is the Kosovo Liberation 
Army in 1998-1999, whose attitudes were arguably influenced by their expectations of benefits 
accruing from international engagement (Whitefield, 2010, p. 12). 
3.2 Preparing a Strategy of Engagement 
In order for the delicate engagement with armed groups to have a positive impact on the resolution 
of the conflict, third parties must have a clear strategy. Prior to a substantive engagement with the 
groups, the third party must carry out a detailed evaluation of the material conditions and the 
subjective aspects affecting the group. Based on this evaluation, it is important to analyze how a 
particular actor can make a difference in promoting negotiability. The analysis must also take into 
account the role of other third parties to determine the added value as well as the potential for a 
coordinated approach. 
The stages described below propose a number of sequential steps for the preparation of an 
engagement strategy. These steps are dynamic and they will typically be repeated periodically during 
an ongoing engagement process. 
1. Assess material conditions of push and pull factors  
Third parties need to understand the context in which they engage. Any engagement initiative must 
begin with a thorough analysis of the conflict environment to identify strategic points of intervention 
and avoid costly mistakes. The first step should focus on assessing the material conditions of the 
push and pull factors. Material indicators provide evidence for the existence of a stalemate and the 
pain associated with it, as well as for the likelihood of a way out. While it is important to keep in 
mind that in any given conflict it is difficult to differentiate subjective from material elements, a 
focus on the conditions on the ground is essential for the subsequent assessment of the armed 
group’s perceptions (Zartman & de Soto, 2010). 
This part of the analysis is based largely on publicly available information. As far as possible, the 
questions in the analytical framework should be answered from an objective point of view. With 
regard to the push factor, the military balance between the two parties, failed attempts of 
escalation, and the costs of military struggle are significant indicators. The crucial indicator of the 
pull factor is whether the government is willing to and capable of negotiating a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict. Comparing the group’s worldview and objectives with the reality of a peace process, 
and assessing the actual capacity of the rebel group to manage a negotiation process can provide 
evidence.  
2. Gather information about intra-group processes 
As a second step, third parties must familiarize themselves with the armed group: “A good 
knowledge  of  the  internal  working  of  the  group  and  their  operating criteria is  essential for an  
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effective engagement”.22 Another mediation practitioner adds: “It is important to have accurate 
information about what is going on inside the group. If a mediation team does not have this 
information, they might interpret certain behaviors in the wrong way”.23 
The general patterns of intra-group processes mentioned above can be helpful to build a better 
understanding. However, gathering information about intra-group dynamics is difficult. An outsider 
can study an armed group’s history, its public statements and behaviors, but the mechanisms of 
decision-making might still remain opaque, especially when the third party does not yet have a 
trusted relationship with the rebels. Cooperation among different actors is important: “You need 
very good informants who can talk you through the ongoing dynamics and the inner working of the 
group, so you are not only getting the story that the rebels choose to tell you, but a more realistic 
picture”.24  
3. Assess the group’s perceptions of push and pull factors 
Based on the assessment of the material conditions and the information about intra-group dynamics, 
the third party can build an understanding of the armed group’s perceptions. A careful evaluation of 
the armed group’s official and unofficial statements is useful to get an idea of their views on the 
push and pull factors.  
The group’s actual perceptions are often hidden from the public because the group wants to avoid 
showing weaknesses. Armed groups rarely acknowledge their assessment of a stalemate and the 
distress they experience. Zartman and de Soto (2010) argue that official statements may still provide 
evidence of the group’s perceptions. In order to assess this evidence, it is essential to be sensitive to 
the source, the tone and the wording of the statements. Slight changes in standard language, leaks, 
backchannel messages and trial balloons are important sources of information in this regard. The 
observer requires a “tuned ear and a sharp eye” (Zartman & de Soto, 2010) to catch the subjective 
indicators.  
In private conversations with commanders, a third party may observe more direct indications of the 
commanders’ discomfort with the prevailing circumstances as well as of their views on the future. 
Rather than asking for the group’s motivation, a third party “should attempt to understand their 
logic and discover how they interpret certain signals”.25  
With regards to the perceptions of the pull factor, there needs to be some degree of awareness that 
concessions are an essential ingredient of a negotiated exit. In this respect, the formulation of 
extensive preconditions might be a sign that an armed group is not seriously considering 
negotiations. When a group has difficulties in establishing its priorities and exhibits a non-
commitment attitude, the pull might not yet have fully come to bear. On the other hand, a re-
formulation of the group’s goals, the partial recognition of the other side’s needs, or other 
cooperative advances are clear signs of negotiability. A mediation practitioner argues: “A partial 
sacrifices of the maximalist position is a strong demonstration of intent”.26  
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4. Examine the engagement, or potential engagement, of other third-party actors 
When considering an engagement with an armed group, third parties must examine what other 
actors are doing. The lack of coordination between different third parties invites the rebel group to 
go ‘forum shopping’: they will look for the interlocutor that serves their purpose best. Competing 
efforts can have a negative effect on fostering negotiability (Svensson & Wallensteen, 2010). 
Zartman and de Soto (2010) argue that multiple third parties “can reinforce each other, on the 
condition that they agree on a lead mediator and consult among themselves frequently” (p. 8). 
Coordination is imperative to avoid different initiatives undercutting each other. Different actors, 
from NGOs to large states, have different comparative advantages, which provide entry points for 
effective engagement: “Non-governmental actors are mostly better placed to maintain contact with 
rebel groups in the early phases of engagement. In later stages, there should be an effective division 
of labor between the main meditator and other third parties. For example, non-governmental actors 
can better engage in capacity-building activities, while the mediator risks loosing impartiality when 
offering assistance to one party”.27 Against this background, it is important that interested third 
parties consult with their peers before getting involved.  
5. Analyze how the engagement can make a difference 
The systematic assessment of the material and subjective indicators of negotiability serves as a basis 
for developing an engagement strategy. Taking into account the conflict environment and the 
presence of other initiatives, the third party must analyze whether it is able bring an added value to 
the situation. Third parties must also consider that their engagement may have negative 
consequences on the peaceful solution of the conflict: “The golden rule for the process is not to do 
harm”.28 To a certain degree, every engagement effort becomes a part of the conflict context. State 
mediators in particular need to be careful not to be driven by their own interests and the 
requirements of domestic public opinion. A mediation practitioner cautions: “Mediators need 
sufficient moral courage to be a honest broker”.29 
The engagement strategy must look at the opportunities provided by the conflict environment and 
the disposition of the rebel group. A mediation practitioner explains: “There are conflicts that are 
not fully ripe for conflict resolution attempts, but this does not mean that you cannot have 
backchannel engagement to try to tie things up. But you are at the mercy of the timing and the 
internal dynamics of the group”.30 There are moments in a conflict cycle when third-party 
engagement fails to produce movement toward negotiability: “When the level of violence is very 
high, there is no point in engaging. The rebels are occupied with the fighting and the level of trust is 
very low. It is better to initiate the engagement during lulls in the fighting”.31 From the outside, a 
waiting position might seem futile, but it is still important to maintain contact so as to tap into 
windows of opportunity when the context evolves: “In the more intractable conflicts, it is the job of 
the mediator not to go away”.32 
Interpersonal relations are central for third parties to have an added value in a process. Thus, a 
mediation practitioner observes: “The personal connection between the third-party representative 
and the members of the armed group is important. If they cannot sit down together at the table and  
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have drink or a cup of tea, their engagement will hardly be successful”.33 After all, the armed group 
will determine the pace of the engagement: “The design of the engagement depends on the 
commitment of the armed group. You can only talk about the substance if they are willing to do 
so”.34 Thus, a mediation practitioner suggests: “The most suitable is a continuous engagement by 
the same person or the same group of persons. A third-party actor requires time with the rebels in 
order to gain their trust and an understanding of their logic. This way, the same topics can be taken 
up again”.35 
An engagement strategy is also constrained by the third party’s mandate. The mandate for 
engagement can be explicit, for example in the case of a Security Council resolution, or implicit 
based on the acquiescence of the parties. Thus, the mandate and the characteristics of the third-
party actor are important factors in defining the type of engagement.  
6. Engage directly with the group 
When implementing an engagement strategy, the third party must continuously reassess the conflict 
environment and the changes in the rebels’ perceptions. Engagement is a continuous and dynamic 
process: “Getting to the point where you engage with the group is one thing, but you must also 
sustain and deepen the dialogue”.36 Engaging with armed groups takes time: “I have been working 
with some groups for six or more months before there was some sign of change”.37 As the third 
party continues to assess the conflict and the intra-group dynamics, the strategy must be adapted to 
the changing context and, if necessary, even suspended. 
While gaining the confidence of the group, the third party must be careful not to act with bias. A 
mediation practitioner warns: “It is important to ensure that you are not acting as a platform for a 
group that is trying to further destabilize a situation. It comes down to judgment and really knowing 
the conflict environment”.38 The mediator who sits at the negotiating table often requires a reality-
check about the events on the ground: “Having a sounding board is absolutely critical”.39 
Empathizing with the rebel group can be an important quality of a mediator, however, in order to 
acquire a good understanding of their logic, the third party must remain as objective as possible in 
its analysis. 
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4 Means to Foster Negotiability 
It is often assumed that outside actors use their muscles to bring armed groups to the table and to 
impose an agreement upon them. Nevertheless, third parties dispose of a wide array of means to 
foster negotiability, including more subtle approaches that do not seek to sway the material 
structure of the conflict. Hopmann (1996) depicts the multiple roles for third parties along a 
continuum “ranging from relatively modest roles, that might best be played by relatively weak or 
neutral mediators, to roles that entail a much higher level of involvement and that probably only can 
be performed by powerful perhaps even partisan mediators” (p. 231). However, with the possible 
exception of certain regional or global powers, most third parties do not have the leverage to 
compel the conflict parties to change their behavior. Instead, these actors aim at convincing the 
parties to pursue their objectives by negotiating rather than by waging war. 
Hence, the present chapter distinguishes two broad sets of approaches to fostering negotiability. The 
first consists of dialogue and facilitation, through which third parties persuade conflict parties to 
alter their perceptions. They thus work on the subjective elements of the push and pull factors, 
encouraging armed groups to negotiate, rather than forcing them to change their behavior. The 
second approach entails using diplomatic, financial and military means, through which third parties 
attempt to change the parties’ incentive structures. The aim of this approach is essentially to affect 
the material referents of the push and pull factors. Without discarding the merits of a more forceful 
approach, in what follows, the working paper concentrates more on the first approach. 
4.1 Encouraging Armed Groups to Negotiate 
Social interaction with third parties can promote a reconsideration of the basic assumptions of the 
conflict (McCartney, 2004; Ashour 2007). Acting on the armed group’s perceptions, third parties can 
convince the rebels of the futility of continued armed struggle and the attractiveness of a negotiated 
exit. This type of approach works mostly through backchannel engagement and fosters a process of 
moderation, re-assessment, as well as confidence and capacity building. 
An approach that centers on the subjective conditions is limited when material referents of ripeness 
are not present. Persuasion may be inadequate when there is no evidence of a hurting stalemate 
and when the parties are completely unwilling to negotiate. Nevertheless, in reality the conditions 
on the ground are rarely clear-cut. The actual impediment to negotiation may be the parties’ 
mistaken assumption that they can win the conflict by force. Thus, the various means of inducing 
cognitive change can constitute an act of ripening. Zartman and de Soto (2010) make a case that 
“mediation is 90 percent persuasion” (p. 8). 
Taking into account the limits of encouragement, this section will proceed with discussing different 
means of influence, which in practice may constitute the overall strategy of engagement. The box 
(see box 4) provides a selection of different techniques for changing the perceptions of armed 
groups. 
Box 4: Techniques for Persuasion 
Asking rebel leaders to articulate their interest and to formulate their position: This technique may 
assist the rebels in noting inconsistencies between their objectives and their behaviors. It may also 
provide for alternative ideas to addressing their interests. 
Conducting informal discussions about the national and international context: Without directly 
addressing sensitive subjects, such informal discussions may constitute a form of reality-check for 
the rebel groups. 
Organizing workshops: In a workshop, the rebels can acquire the skills and expertise necessary for a 
successful negotiation process. Moreover, a workshop provides for an informal setting, where the 
rebels can build confidence with other people from their group and, potentially, also with 
government representatives. 
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Providing examples from other conflicts: Providing examples from similar conflicts can help the 
armed groups to recognize that acceptable solutions are possible and have been beneficial for rebel 
movements in other contexts. 
Brainstorming: Without committing to a particular solution, a brainstorming exercise allows the 
rebels to imagine a potential solution and to widen their horizon. 
Suggesting possible ways out: When the members of the armed group are unable to perceive 
alternative options, the third party can attempt to stimulate their creativity by suggesting new ideas. 
Promoting a coordinated approach of different third parties: When different national and 
international actors give the armed group the same feedback about the need to negotiate, the rebels 
may begin to take the advice serious. 
Including broader constituencies: A creative way of reconnecting the group to their constituency 
might allow the rebels to become aware of the human cost of continued violence.  
Bringing in people whom the group trusts: People who benefit from the group’s confidence are able 
to have informal discussions and ask difficult questions.  
Bringing in a person of moral authority: Armed groups are more likely to accept a compromise if it 
results from an appeal of conscience made by a person of moral authority (i.e. Nelson Mandela, 
Jimmy Carter).  
Bringing in peers from other countries: Former rebels from other countries have the ability to induce 
a reality-check and to provide ideas about potential solutions.  
 
4.1.1 Probing the conflict assessment 
Frequently rebel groups fail to recognize the existence of a stalemate and to fully appreciate the 
extent of pain associated with it. That's why “armed groups quite often need a reality check”.40 In a 
purely communicative exercise, third parties may stimulate a pragmatic appreciation of facts on the 
ground. Such probing aims at enhancing the push away from a violent strategy. One mediation 
practitioner describes this as follows: “Engagement with outsiders helps armed groups to realize 
whether it is realistic to achieve their goals through the armed struggle”.41  
However, exploring an armed group’s view of the conflict and their capabilities also includes risks: 
“It is a real challenge to work through the conflict assessment with the group, because you are 
dealing with sensitive military information. If you try too hard to get information, you can unravel 
their trust”.42 Dealing with such a delicate topic for the armed group requires sensitivity and a high 
level of confidence between the third-party actor and the rebels: “Rather than a formal discussion 
about the conflict, a person who has the confidence of the armed group is able to have human 
conversation with the rebels. They can talk about their aspirations, their families and their fallen 
comrades”.43 Diplomatic talent and strong skills of persuasion are crucial in this endeavor. Third 
parties must strike a balance between asking critical questions, on the one hand, and raising 
suspicion for interfering with sensitive subjects, on the  other hand. A mediation practitioner empha- 
 
 
______________________ 
40 Interview with mediation practitioner, 26 July 2011/b 
41 Interview with mediation practitioner, 26 July 2011/a 
42 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/a 
43 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/a 
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sizes this point: “Listening is important. The person engaging should show that he or she has an 
interest in learning from the rebel”.44 Changing a conflict assessment is a slow process: “One might 
have the impression that they do not really listen to what you are saying, but they do. Rebel leaders 
do take lessons from their engagement with third parties, although they will never give you an 
immediate reaction”.45 
While showing an understanding for the rebels’ views, the third party should draw attention to the 
facts on the ground and encourage the group to reflect on the chances of winning as well as to 
evaluate the costs and losses associated with continued warfare. In discussions with armed groups, 
third parties may refer to the military, political and economic aspects of the push factor. Although 
the rebels will refrain from elaborating on the details of their operations, a general discussion on 
these dimensions might lead to a reassessment. An effective approach may include warning the 
rebels of the dire political consequences of their failure to reach an agreement: “A mediator can try 
to illustrate to the rebels the political cost of the armed struggle for the country and for their 
group”.46 Besides probing the conflict assessment through direct dialogue, third parties may also 
discreetly foster awareness of the hurting stalemate through relevant opinion leaders, media 
channels and Track-II efforts (Zartman & de Soto, 2010, p. 30). 
Many armed groups feel that they can still achieve military victory, even if the situation on the 
ground is not conducive. Sometimes, rebels officially express their commitment to the militant 
strategy, but as they become aware of the stalemate, they gradually adapt their approach. In the 
words of a mediation practitioner: “Everybody says that they want to achieve a military victory. I do 
not see this as an obstacle. Ripeness has to come over time”.47 Another mediation practitioner 
describes the armed groups’ logic as follows: “Rebel groups often see the armed struggle as the only 
way to achieve their objectives. For them, the argument that weapons are not effective is not 
persuasive. The question must be whether there are other valid options that can be tested”.48 Hence 
the reality-check on the push factor must also extend to the pull factor. 
4.1.2 Promoting moderation 
Trapped in the logic of militancy, armed groups often do not see a way out of armed struggle. Third-
party efforts can stimulate a process of moderation, which might allow the rebel group to perceive 
the possibility of a negotiated solution: “In the beginning, armed groups only think about military 
victory, but when they see that there is a stalemate and they believe that this stalemate will drag on 
for a long time, they can be persuaded more easily to negotiate. They know what they want, but 
they need to realize that they cannot get everything they want”.49 
When a conflict has existed for a long time and takes on a deep, emotional intensity, cognitive 
change is extremely hard to bring about (Hopmann, 1996, p. 233). Deep-seated values are difficult 
to negotiate. However, simply accusing armed groups of radicalism is not effective: “Some people 
might need to blame the armed groups, but others need to engage them more constructively, trying 
to build a trustful relationship, so that at one point they are ready to listen to new ideas”.50 
Persuasive backchannel engagement with rebels may contribute to lowering their ideological and 
psychological barriers  that inhibit the perception of a negotiated solution (Haysom, 2005). However,  
 
______________________ 
44 Interview with mediation practitioner, 9 August 2011 
45 Interview with mediation practitioner, 23 September 2011 
46 Interview with mediation practitioner, 23 August 2011 
47 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/b 
48 Interview with mediation practitioner, 5 August 2011 
49 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/b 
50 Interview with mediation practitioner, 2 August 2011 
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a mediation practitioner warns: “It can be very dangerous to question the group’s ideology. A third-
party actor has to be modest in this regard. A comparison with other countries might be useful to 
circumvent direct probing”.51 Another practitioner suggests strengthening moderates within the 
groups: “In every group you will find some moderate voices. As a mediator, you can try to use those 
inside the group to help them through a process of moderation”.52 
Even when an armed group is not opposed to negotiation as a matter of principle, the rebels might 
find it difficult to sense the compatibility of their objective with a negotiated exit. As a matter of 
fact, “rebels often have the perception that the power comes only from the gun”.53 Their logic is to 
confront, not to compromise. One practitioner explains the difficult task for third parties: “No group 
that sees itself as the vanguard of political change is interested in giving up political power and 
sharing it with others. The challenge is how to help them to reframe their approach and to be open 
to new ideas and positive lessons”.54 Third parties can remind the rebels that arms are only one 
means to achieving a political goal, and help them to take their struggle from the battleground to 
the political realm.  
In this regard, third parties may also induce the rebels to change their preferences by helping them 
see the problem in a new light. Through their engagement, “outsiders help [the armed groups] to 
articulate their interests clearly, to formulate their position, and to think through what the best way 
is to achieve their interests”.55 Although they will encounter resistance, outsiders should cautiously 
push for greater levels of detail in their discussion with the rebels. A mediation practitioner clarifies: 
“Many rebel leaders have the desire to explain their view of the conflict”.56 The process of 
explaining the political agenda to outsiders might help armed groups to recognize “the 
inconsistency between their program and their practice, and exposes possible routes for a 
negotiated solution” (Herbolzheimer, 2011). Such ‘politicization’ promotes the armed group’s 
perception of compatibility. As the rebels often feel that any compromise is a slippery slope leading 
to the government’s victory, mediators can foster an understanding that a peace process entails 
compromises from both sides. Correspondingly, a rebel group may also feel that making concessions 
at the suggestion of a mediator is less harmful to its reputation and future bargaining position than 
conceding to the adversary in direct negotiations (Zartman & Touval, 2001, p. 223). 
Furthermore, third parties may identify acceptable outcomes, test salient solutions and air 
alternatives to widen the group’s horizon. The goal is reframing the issues, so the conflict seems less 
stark. In this respect, “creativity is important to help the armed group imagine a possible end 
game”.57 Phrases like “What would you do if…?” or “Under what circumstances would you 
consider…?” are useful to stimulate the imagination of the group (Zartman & de Soto, 2010, p. 31). 
A mediation practitioner asserts: “It is important to help armed groups to understand what is 
needed to run a state or to administer natural resources. The groups will adopt more pragmatic 
positions when they have more expertise”.58 
Different methods are possible for inducing the perception of a way out, including direct 
engagement between rebel commanders and third-party actors and highlighting possible solutions 
through public  channels of  communication.  As a mediation  practitioner points  out, a coordinated  
 
______________________ 
51 Interview with mediation practitioner, 23 September 2011 
52 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/b 
53 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/b 
54 Interview with mediation practitioner, 2 August 2011 
55 Interview with mediation practitioner, 26 July 2011/a 
56 Interview with mediation practitioner, 5 August 2011 
57 Interview with mediation practitioner, 4 August 2011 
58 Interview with mediation practitioner, 30 August 2011 
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approach is of particular importance: “A number of people with a coordinated approach can help in 
even a very intractable conflict to change the minds of apparently very narrow-minded militants”.59 
4.1.3 Building confidence 
A minimum of confidence in the government is required for negotiability. As an incremental process, 
“confidence is built through tangible and realistic evidence”.60 A third party should look for 
moments in the conflict cycle that provide fertile ground for confidence-building efforts. By helping 
the armed group to interpret gestures by the government, deliver credible messages and identify 
confidence-building measures, third parties take an important role in fostering the armed group’s 
confidence vis-à-vis the government.  
First and foremost, the third party may promote the group’s understanding that their opponent is 
also their negotiation partner (Haysom, 2005, p. 86). In order to avoid misunderstanding and 
escalation, a credible third party actor has an important role in “help[ing] the group interpret the 
changes in the government’s attitude and policy”.61 By encouraging them to understand the conflict 
from each other’s point of view, third parties may assist the parties in developing empathy for the 
other’s arguments and behaviors. 
An essential role of any mediator is to keep the channels of communication open. Whereas the full 
sharing of information may produce fears of possible exploitation, a third-party facilitator can help 
the conflict parties to share basic information during the pre-negotiations phase (Hopmann, 1996). 
In an environment of distrust, outsiders can thus deliver credible messages from the government. 
Explaining the usefulness of communication in the early states of a process, a mediation practitioner 
asserts: “It helps if the commanders see that it is beneficial to have a channel even if they are not 
yet sitting at the table. Especially if they see some short-term progress, they may slowly change their 
approach to negotiations”.62  
Third parties can also identify “small steps that show to the other side that there is a change in 
attitude and that they can collaborate in some way”.63 Confidence-building measures go beyond the 
military field. Especially during pre-negotiations, non-binding social and humanitarian measures are 
more applicable, such as agreements over prisoner exchanges or joint sport and cultural events. 
Nevertheless, partial steps in the political and security field are also possible to avoid escalation 
triggered by misunderstanding or to create an atmosphere of trust in society (Mason & Siegfried, 
forthcoming). Most third parties cannot request confidence-building measures from the government 
or the rebel group, but they might subtly suggest ideas to either side.  
Rather than addressing the root causes of conflict, these measures build confidence by establishing 
relationships, signaling positive intention and creating incentives to continue the engagement. 
Although confidence-building measures are generally low cost and low risk, tailor-made actions are 
more costly and less ambiguous than words, and therefore “more credible and more useful in 
helping [to] read the intentions of others” (Mason & Siegfried, forthcoming). Unilateral signals of 
good intention should develop into reciprocal actions and even preliminary agreements. For 
example, humanitarian agreements can serve as a door opener for discussions that will eventually 
lead to the overall resolution of the conflict (Petrasek, 2005). However, these measures are not a 
silver bullet. Confidence-building measures are useful when the lack of trust in the opponent is a 
major  hindrance to  negotiations,  but they are  not a replacement for the lack of a push away from  
 
______________________ 
59 Interview with mediation practitioner, 2 August 2011 
60 Interview with mediation practitioner, 4 August 2011 
61 Interview with mediation practitioner, 2 August 2011 
62 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/a 
63 Interview with mediation practitioner, 26 July 2011/b 
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the armed struggle. Wrongly designed and mediated, these measures can even be “misused as a 
stalling or cover-up tactic, or lead to biased impacts” (Mason & Siegfried, forthcoming). 
4.1.4 Strengthening capacity 
Excessive asymmetry between the government and the armed group serves as a deterrent to the 
rebels’ perception of negotiability: “It does not make sense to negotiate when the knowledge and 
power difference between the conflicting parties is too big”.64 A mediation practitioner explains as 
follows: “Armed groups often need more support before and during a peace process, because they 
do not have as many financial, political and even intellectual resources as the government, and they 
also face the issue of legitimacy”.65 By building capacity for negotiations, third parties can enhance 
the rebels’ trust in the negotiation process. These capacity-building efforts can range from building 
awareness and expertise to assisting the armed group to enter negotiations with a unified stance.  
One reason why armed groups do not want to negotiate is that they do not know how negotiations 
work and what they can gain from them: “When they know what they are dealing with, they are in 
a better position to decide whether they want to negotiate or not”.66 Through workshops or other 
forms of training, representatives of the armed group can familiarize themselves with the idea of 
interest-based negotiations. Through the introduction of new ideas, skills and creativity, third parties 
can thus foster ripeness (United Nations, 2009). In this regard, “a mediator should help to create a 
critical and constructive attitude towards negotiations”.67 Nevertheless, it is also essential to 
promote trust during the negotiations process: “The mediator can maintain confidence in 
negotiations by explaining during each phase how the process works”.68 In addition to building 
negotiating skills, third parties can offer training on particular conflict issues, such as natural 
resources or power-sharing arrangements, in order to develop the group’s expertise. The participants 
in the workshops may not be the decision-makers of the group, but their participation can make an 
important contribution to the formation of a critical mass within the group.  
Because the participation in capacity-building exercises requires a level of openness toward a peace 
process, most of these measures take place at a stage when the rebel group has already developed a 
basic interest in a negotiated exit. A mediation practitioner puts the approach in perspective: “Once 
a group seriously considers negotiating, it helps to raise awareness about the functioning of 
negotiation processes and to build capacity for negotiations. But this usually comes at a later stage 
in the engagement. The capacity-building part is important, but not as important as the previous 
engagement”.69  
The cohesiveness of the rebel group also relates to their capacity to negotiate and therefore 
negotiability: A divided group will usually be more hesitant to enter a negotiation process. Alvaro de 
Soto asserts: “Rebel groups require periods of consultation before and during negotiations. If they 
are divided or even split into fractions, the negotiations will be more difficult”.70 Third parties can 
provide spaces, for example training workshops, for people from different factions with the aim of 
supporting intra-group confidence. Stressing a dilemma in this regard, a mediation practitioner 
explains: “Armed groups need to sit down together and make sure that they are as united as 
possible  before they go  into the talks. But for  a third party, it is challenging to support this process.  
 
______________________ 
64 Interview with mediation practitioner, 5 August 2011 
65 Interview with mediation practitioner, 2 August 2011 
66 Interview with mediation practitioner, 5 August 2011 
67 Interview with mediation practitioner, 2 August 2011 
68 Interview with mediation practitioner, 26 July 2011/b 
69 Interview with mediation practitioner, 26 July 2011/a 
70 Interview with Alvaro de Soto, 8 August 2011 
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When you put them all in the room, you might be just helping them to coordinate the next military 
move. As we do not know what is really going on within the group, we are at risk of being played. 
And you might be viewed as strengthening the position of the rebels. It is a calculated risk that third 
parties must assess on a case-by-case basis”.71 When it is impossible for third parties to provide 
space for within-group consultations, they can nonetheless advise rebel groups to continue to 
consult broadly within their own structures. Third parties must also be careful not to push groups to 
take a decision that they may not be ready to take given their internal dynamics. 
Sometimes the leadership of the rebel movement does not adequately represent the supposed 
support base of the movement. When the constituency does not feel represented by negotiating 
leaders, splinters or spoilers may result. Third parties can play a modest role in assuring some 
representation of the broader constituency. A mediation practitioner suggests: “At the early stages 
of engagement, it is important to advise the groups about the importance of their constituencies and 
offer to assist them with connecting back. Third parties can be essential in finding creative ways of 
bringing in the constituency in a way that empowers them”.72  
4.1.5 Providing reassurance 
Sometimes security and logistical concerns impede a rebel group from seriously considering 
negotiations with the government. In this respect, a third party can reassure the rebels of their safe 
and equal participation at the negotiating table. “When armed groups say no to negotiations, they 
are often worried about something. It is our job to address their fears and to provide support for 
talks. Of course, this support must be compatible with the context”.73 Supportive measures can 
include the presence during the negotiation of representatives of the international community and 
physical protection for rebel leaders at talks. An international presence makes it more difficult for 
the conflict parties to exploit the peace process and it therefore provides some form of assurance 
(Lounsbery & Cook, 2011, p. 74). Holding negotiations abroad is also a possibility: “The option of 
having dialogues and negotiations in a third country provides the group with a significant 
reassurance”.74  
4.2 Transforming the Incentive Structure of Armed Groups 
In contrast to persuasive means of fostering negotiability, the active alteration of the rebels’ 
incentive structures demands a more forceful third-party involvement. This is a role that can only be 
played by a powerful state or a coalition of states. While such an approach may have some merit 
when the material conditions of ripeness are not given, manipulation also bears the risk of rendering 
the conflict more intractable. By using leverage to manipulate the external environment, the third 
party becomes an active participant to the conflict (Hopmann, 1996, p. 240). It may also compromise 
a third party’s ability to play the role of a mediator in the future. 
Third parties can apply diplomatic, economic or military measures to influence the material referents 
of the push and pull factors. In essence, third parties may attempt to alter the incentive structure in a 
way that aggravates the consequences of a continued armed struggle and thus improves the 
prospect of a negotiated exit. With regards to the pull factor, third-party efforts can make 
negotiations more attractive by adding incentives to the peace process. Outside pressure on the 
government  may also  increase the  rebels’ confidence  that the government will negotiate seriously.  
 
______________________ 
71 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/a 
72 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/a 
73 Interview with mediation practitioner, 3 August 2011/b 
74 Interview with mediation practitioner, 23 August 2011 
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Furthermore, by engineering a hurting stalemate, powerful third parties can strengthen the push 
away from armed struggle (Zartman, 2008).  
4.2.1 Providing incentives for negotiations 
Economic measures can be particularly potent for increasing the attractiveness of a cooperative 
strategy. Selective inducements can provide tangible benefits that cause group members to 
moderate their belief and to acknowledge the benefit of a negotiated exit (Ashour, 2007). Third 
parties can induce concessions by compensating the armed group, mainly through the provision of 
political legitimacy and financial resources. Furthermore, offering a peace dividend can increase the 
value of negotiation. For example, these incentives are related to development programs or plans for 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. However, economic benefits 
may also distract the parties from finding sustainable solutions that address the causes of armed 
conflict. 
4.2.2 Engineering a hurting stalemate 
Positive incentives do not stand out clearly unless they are contrasted with worse alternatives. A 
third party can limit the armed group’s alternatives and therefore contribute to making the 
continued pursuit of armed struggle less attractive. Third parties can employ, or threaten to employ, 
military, political and financial measures or to withhold support in order to engineer a hurting 
stalemate (Conciliation Resources, 2009). 
Politically, third parties can increase the cost of continued violence by indicating that its relations 
with the rebels will be affected if they do not pursue a negotiated exit to the conflict. For rebel 
groups with a desire to achieve international legitimacy, such a warning increases the cost of staying 
away from the negotiating table. However, the third party must be cognizant that ending its 
engagement with the armed group may make future engagements more difficult (Zartman & de 
Soto, 2010). Particularly effective pressure targets the sources of income of an armed group 
(Wennmann, p. 1129-1131). For example, the imposition of targeted sanctions may contribute to the 
perception of pain, thereby pushing a group away from continued armed struggle. Similarly, when 
third parties withhold resources, they may have a powerful impact on the rebels’ perception of the 
push factors. 
Military measures rarely include direct confrontation. However, withholding military support from 
the rebel group can contribute to their perception of negotiability. The main purpose of military 
measures is to keep the parties locked in a conflict stalemate, thereby creating a situation in which 
neither party feels strong enough to win the conflict, but at the same time they do not feel too weak 
to face the other party in negotiations (Zartman & de Soto, 2010). Nevertheless, the attempt to 
externally engineer a hurting stalemate can be problematic. Rather than creating a ripe moment, 
such a manipulative approach might add to the complexity and intensity of the armed conflict.  
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5 Conclusion 
More than the material conditions of the conflict environment themselves, it is an armed group’s 
perception of these conditions that determines its willingness to negotiate. For a group to see the 
conflict as negotiable, a critical mass within the group must perceive a push away from the armed 
struggle as well as a pull into negotiations. In this regard, the framework presented in this paper 
provides a tool to analyze the perceptions of a particular armed group. 
As intra-group dynamics and exogenous events affect these perceptions, negotiability should not be 
seen as a firm label, but as a process that is influenced by factors internal and external to the group. 
It is therefore sensible not to categorically brand any particular group as negotiable or not. Rebel 
groups are often militant at the onset of armed conflict, but at another point they may recognize the 
conflict as negotiable. From the perspective of a third party interested in supporting the peaceful 
resolution of a conflict, this realization opens possibilities for non-intrusive forms of engagement.  
When discussing third-party influence on the rebels’ approach to negotiations, it is important to 
acknowledge that there are still a lot of unknowns regarding the logic of violence. Armed conflicts 
and negotiations are highly political activities; therefore, the reasoning that drives a group’s 
decision-making is necessarily case-specific. Nevertheless, insights from practitioners and scholars 
have shown that third parties can have a positive impact on negotiability. With the right intention 
and the appropriate strategy, outsiders may affect the group’s perception in a way that promotes 
their willingness to seek negotiations. While not providing clear-cut remedies, the framework in this 
paper may help with structuring the analysis that constitutes the basis for devising strategies for 
engagement.  
A peace process is more than talks at the negotiating table – and negotiability is not necessarily a 
constant throughout this process. Third-party engagement can be essential in shaping and 
sustaining the rebels’ sense that the conflict should and could be solved by cooperative means. In 
this regard, the paper has argued that persuasive means of engagement might often be more 
effective in the long-term than use of threats or punishment. A combination of persuasion and 
power diplomacy may lead to positive results in some cases, though the use of ‘muscle’ also risks 
destroying confidence in third parties and radicalizing a rebel group. In order to be effective, 
persuasive efforts need to focus on demonstrating the inconvenience of the armed struggle and 
enhancing the legitimacy and attractiveness of a negotiated solution. This reflection about non-
coercive engagement is made against the backdrop of the apparent failure of exclusively repressive 
strategies that many governments have adopted in the wave of the War on Terror. Engaging a 
group, as opposed to isolating it, may not be the appropriate approach in all situations, but it should 
never be dismissed without a proper assessment of its potential.  
Engagement with a rebel group might take years before the approach produces visible results. 
Cooperation among different third-party actors, domestic and international, enhances the 
effectiveness of engagement strategies. However, for engagement not to become an end in itself, 
third parties must continuously reassess their strategy. Lack of tangible progress is not necessarily an 
argument against engagement, but there are ethical and political limits to its utility. Inadequate 
approaches might prolong the violence instead of advancing a peaceful resolution. Engaging with 
rebels can also be problematic to the extent that it may be perceived as legitimizing a group that has 
committed serious war crimes. Hence, third parties must be aware that through their engagement 
they inevitably become part of the context; and they must make every effort to assess potential or 
actual harm, and to reality-check whether their approach is likely to have the desired effect. 
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following mediation practitioners: 
Alvaro de Soto 
Former Senior Official at the United Nations 
Darío Antonio Echeverri Gonzales 
Secretary-General of the Colombian National Reconciliation Commission 
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Jean-Pierre Gontard 
Former Emissary of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for Colombia 
Jeffrey Mapendere 
Member of the United Nations Standby Team of Mediation Experts 
Julian Hottinger 
Senior Mediation Expert with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
Katia Papagianni 
Head of the Mediation Support Programme at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
Kristian Herbolzheimer 
Director of Philippines and Colombia Programmes at Conciliation Resources 
Meredith Preston McGhie 
Senior Programme Manager at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
Murezi Michael 
Head of Mediation Support at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
Raffaela Schiavello 
Programme Officer Humanitarian Policy at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
Simon Manson 
Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich 
Jesús Albeiro Parra Solís 
Delegate for Peace and Human Rights at the Dioceses of Quibdó, Colombia 
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